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ABSTRACT 
 
 American labour law is broken. As many as 60 percent of American 
workers would like to have a union, yet only 12 percent actually do. This is 
largely due to systematic employer interference, often in violation of existing 
laws. The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), currently before Congress, contains 
provisions to rectify this problem. Canada's experience with similar provisions 
can be helpful in evaluating the arguments surrounding this act. It suggests that 
the reforms proposed in EFCA can be expected to safeguard rather than deny 
employees' free choices. They will not alter the balance of power in collective 
bargaining, but only help to ensure that workers can exercise their basic right to 
meaningful representation at work and, potentially, to win gains that could help 
to reduce inequality and return America to prosperity. 
 
 
FULL COMMENT 
 
ollective bargaining is an internationally recognized human right. 
Many view it as central to the ability of workers to achieve decent 
pay and fair treatment at work. When surveyed, a majority of C 
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Americans say they support it.1 Yet the American system of labour law, which 
workers rely on in order to exercise this right, is broken. 
Research reveals that, although close to 60 percent of American workers 
would like to have a union, only 12 percent actually do.2 Employers regularly 
resort to lies, threats, and coercion during a union organizing drive. They are 
found guilty of illegally firing employees in 25 percent of these drives.3 
Things are so bad that four out of every five American workers believe 
employees actively seeking union representation will likely lose their jobs.4 As 
one government committee has concluded: “fear is no doubt one cause of the 
persistent unsatisfied demand for union representation on the part of a 
substantial minority of American workers.”5 
Even where workers succeed in gaining certification, recent research from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology shows there is only about a 60 percent 
chance of ever achieving a collective agreement.6 Employers often refuse to 
bargain in good faith, and although this is against the law, it is difficult to 
establish and there are few legal remedies for ensuring an agreement is reached.7 
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), now before Congress, proposes to 
address these problems. Specifically, it would allow for reliance on signed union 
membership cards to establish whether workers wish to be represented by a 
union, give the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) stronger remedial 
powers to deal with employer unfair labour practices, and allow either party to 
apply for first contract mediation and arbitration if a collective agreement is not 
reached within ninety days. Canadian labour law has included several of these 
features for many decades and this experience can be helpful in evaluating the 
arguments surrounding EFCA. Our commentary focuses on card certification 
and first contract arbitration. 
Critics of card-based certification argue that it is undemocratic and would 
expose workers to deception and even coercion from union organizers and 
supporters. They insist a secret ballot election is the only way to ensure workers 
can exercise a free choice. The Canadian experience over several decades with 
card-based certification offers little support for such claims. Complaints against 
unions for undue pressure or coercion have been rare in Canada, and findings 
that unions have been guilty of such practices even rarer. The Canadian 
experience also indicates that certification based on union authorization cards is 
efficient and, where there has been uncertainty about the union’s majority 
support, labour relations boards have had the authority to conduct a certification 
vote.  
Opponents rely on a political analogy to support their case. This analogy 
is false. Political elections are held to determine who will govern. Certification 
determines who will go to the bargaining table to negotiate working conditions 
with the employer. In addition, political elections allow competing parties 
relatively equal access to voters, and neither party has undue power over them. 
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Certification occurs in a context where neither is the case. Employers have much 
greater, day-to-day access than union organizers could ever hope to have, and 
are in a position to resort to various forms of intimidation, including threatening 
employees with their jobs and even firing them. 
One option is to require a ballot, but to minimize the time between when 
a union applies for certification and the holding of that ballot. In theory, this 
lessens the opportunities for employer interference. In practice, however, it fails 
to resolve the democratic imbalance. A number of Canadian provinces now have 
just such a procedure, and normally hold votes within 5 or 10 days of a union 
application. In almost all, there are much stronger restrictions than in the US on 
what employers may legally communicate to employees during this period. Yet 
employers are still able to take advantage of their greater access to workers to 
dissuade them from unionizing. For instance, employer unfair labour practices 
have been shown to be twice as effective at discouraging unionization where 
certification votes are required.8 
The research shows that unions are significantly less likely to become 
certified when these provisions are in place than when there is provision for 
automatic card certification. This is especially the case where the vote is delayed 
so that the election takes place outside of established time limits. Only where 
there are procedures in place to prevent their violation are time limits likely to be 
effective, 9 and such procedures may be difficult to legislate and enforce given 
U.S. legal norms and traditions.10 
The second issue we wish to address is first contract arbitration. 
Opponents of this provision have expressed concerns that arbitration would be 
detrimental to the economic interests of employers and that unions will “hold 
out” rather than settle in the expectation they will get a more favourable outcome 
from an arbitrator. A system of first contract arbitration was first introduced in 
Canada in 1974. The rationale for first contract arbitration was to remedy 
situations where anti-union employers continued to resist the right of workers to 
engage in collective bargaining following their certification.  
Research indicates that first contract arbitration is a last resort in settling 
disputes. Unions and employers are almost always able to successfully negotiate 
their first agreement without resort to arbitration, often with the assistance of 
mediation. Between 1986 and 2005, there were 35,585 certifications granted in 
those jurisdictions with FCA.  In only approximately 4 percent of these cases was 
first contract arbitration applied for, and in less than 2 percent of these cases 
was it granted. This does not mean that an arbitrated first agreement actually 
resulted – the parties may well settle on their own before arbitration occurs or is 
concluded.11 
 Where arbitration does occur, arbitrators and labour boards have 
developed guiding principles ensuring that reasonable terms result.12 These can 
be substantial if employees are receiving substantially less than others in their 
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industry. But in most cases they are not. For example, in a recent case in Quebec, 
involving low wage jobs at Wal-Mart (the US equivalent of $7.00 an hour), the 
arbitrator awarded the US equivalent of only a 25 cent pay increase, along with 
minimal provisions found in virtually all collective agreements.13 
 The reforms proposed by the drafters of the EFCA are intended to 
protect the right of American workers to join a union and bargain collectively. 
Opponents are worried these proposed reforms go too far. We believe the 
Canadian experience provides assurance that this is not likely to be the case. 
Such reforms can be expected to safeguard rather than deny employees' free 
choices. 
 The EFCA will not alter the balance of power in collective bargaining, 
even though experts uniformly agree that this balance has tilted increasingly in 
favour of employers in recent decades. It will only help to ensure that workers 
can exercise their basic right to meaningful representation at work and, 
potentially, win well-deserved gains that many have long been denied -- and 
which could prove more effective than all the government schemes in the world 
for reducing inequality and returning America to prosperity.  
 The EFCA may be the most contentious piece of legislation before 
Congress this term.  From where we sit, it will serve as the litmus test as to 
whether America has entered the new era promised by last fall's election. 
 As they say, "as America goes, so goes the world." As your neighbours 
and friends to the north, we very much hope that the direction will be forward. 
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